This paper builds on previous papers about private equity fundraising in two ways. Firstly, a micro and macroeconomic theoretical base is developed to support the empirical model proposed. Secondly, new explanatory variables that are related t o the private equity process Itself are added, thus completing the set of variables, which were basically macroeconomic and environment-related variables, introduced in previous papers. In this way, the paper contributes to the absence of literature in this Issue. The data Is based on seventeen countries of the European Union. Evidence is found of the positive and significant effect of lagged aggregated investments and divestments on new funds raised, together with GDP growth and the evolution of gross domestic savings.
There is a large body of academic research on the shareholder wealth implications of takeovers and mergers as a means of corporate growth but the evidence from the effect of JVs Is relatively limited and mainly derive from studies In the US market. In the area of JVs, prior research has looked at the effect of JV decisions on shareholder wealth and the detarmining factors such as industry relation to the parent companies and locality of the operations. This study will shed more light on the significance and t he effect of JV decision on shareholder wealth by prlviding fresh and more recent evidence from the UK. It will also provide additional evidence on the growing body of academic research related to the effectiveness of the structure of managerial remuneration. We Investigate the wealt h implication of JV decisions for the shareholders of the parent companies and their determining factors and we compare this to alternative modes of corporate growth such as takeovers and mergers. Additionally, we examine the effect of the proportion of the equity based compensation (EBC) In the executives' payment packages on the quality of JV decisions. This will provide a useful insight on the level of the effectiveness of the EBC part of executive remuneration on the quality of managerial decision.
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We expect that if grants of options and other nonpecuniary element of managerial compensation is an effective means of aligning managerial and shareholders' interests, t he shareholder wealth implications of JV decisions Is significantly higher for companies with higher proportion of EBC in managerial remuneration than those with lower proportion. Co-author(s): Sandeep Nabar Prior studies have found that stock returns around announcements of bond upgrades are insignificant, but that stock prices respond negatively to announcements of bond downgrades. This asymmetric st ock market reaction suggests that bond downgrades are timelier than upgrades. This study investigates this conjecture by examining changes In firms' probabilities of bankruptcy around rating change announcements. The results indicat e that the probability of bankruptcy decreases before bond upgrades, but not after. By contrast, the probability of bankruptcy increases both before and after bond downgrades. Additional tests reveal that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by differences in pre-ratlng change volunt ary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms, or by differences in t he intraquarter timing of upgrades and downgrades. The result that bond downgrades are timely indicators of deterioration in firms' financial prospects is likely to be of interest to regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, who are currently investigating the rating agencies' role in the capital markets. high-growth, high-uncertainty firms, characterised by a unique business concept, significant growth opportunities, and/or no real positive cash flows to show t he profit potential of the venture, is a major challenge faced by most venture capitalists (Gompers (1995)). Unlike for an investment in publicly traded securities for which there exists a well-defined pricing mechanism, it is difficult to find an objective valuation for the investment holdings of a venture capital fu nd. The valuation of individual unquoted investments is, thus, a very complicated process. subject t o the discretion and judgment from the part of the venture capitalist. Recently, growing criticism and increasing interest are observed regarding the valuation of the private equity and venture capital portfolios of high-tech, high risk, high growth venture investments (EVCA (2001), Millner (2002), Blaydon & Horvath (2002)). Consequent ly, the underlying goal of the empirical analyses included in this paper corresponds exactly with revealing the valuation methodology operated by venture capitalists when determining or reconsidering t he valuation for each venture investment held in portfolio. 
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Co-author(s): Gavin C Reid This paper uses primary source data on investors and investees, in high technology firms, to examine two risk classes (agency and business risk) within an applied principal-agent setting . It is found that investor and investee rankings of invest ment opportunities are statistically significant. Further, they are very similar, using a statistical measure of concordance. This finding is illustrated by a new graphical device. Views on factors which are important to risk appraisal were also found to be statistically significant for both investors and investees. However, judgments were significantly discordant in t his case. This is illustrated graphically, and discussed. Investors were found to be more concerned with agency risk, attaching to effects like motivation, empowerment and alignment, then invest ees. I nvestees were more concerned with business risk, attaching to effects like market opportunities. The principal-agent framework is thereby confirmed as appropriate to this form of investor-investee contracting . , the extent of increase (decrease) in t he intensity of hedging act ivity wit h derivatives depends on the extent to which prior to adoption a firm has displayed a high ability to effectively hedge and also to the extent that a firm was engaged in managing entity level risk, as opposed to microhedging. The results are largely consistent with predictions, and provide some evidence that SFAS 133 did have an economic impact. These results, however, are not robust to t he all specifications of variable measurement employed in prior literat ure and used to determine firms' benchmark risk management policy. Among the variables likely to influence reporting choices in post adoption period, the ability to effectively hedge is consistently found to
